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The Scope of the Residual Hearsay
Exceptions in the Federal
Rules of Evidence
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED*
The residual hearsay exceptions contained within the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence permit a judge to admit trustworthy
hearsay even if the declaration does not fall within a specific
exception. In this Article, Professor Imwinkelried discusses
the heated controversy which has arisen over the residual
exceptions' scope. Many of the decided cases construe the
exceptions narrowly and limit them to rare instances where
the evidence has extraordinary probative value. Professorlm-
winkelried considers the viability of a more liberal construc-
tion of the exceptions and concludes that a broad construction
is more literal, purposive, and reasonable.
On July 1, 1975, the Federal Rules of Evidence became effective.'
Rules 803 and 804 list the exceptions to the hearsay rule.2 Both Rules
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1. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 1, 88 Stat. 1926 (codified at FED. R.
EvD. 101-1103).
2. FED. R. Evm. 803 & 804.
conclude with a catch-all or residual exception. 3 Rule 803(24) is
illustrative:
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing excep-
tions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi-
ness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evi-
dence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the
point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the propo-
nent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general
purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served
by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement
may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it
makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial
or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to
prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the statement and the particu-
lars of it, including the name and address of the declarant.
4
These residual exceptions have proved to be one of the most con-
troversial features of the Federal Rules. At first, the exceptions pre-
cipitated debate among the members of the Advisory Committee
which drafted the Rules. In 1969, at the Annual Judicial Conference
of the Second Circuit, one Committee member, Frank Raichle, charg-
ed that the exceptions gave trial judges undue discretion and pro-
moted "government by men and not by law. "5 The controversy next
surfaced during the Congressional consideration of the Rules. The
House Committee on the Judiciary voiced the fear that the residual
exceptions would "[inject] too much uncertainty into the law of
evidence and [impair] the ability of practitioners to prepare for
trial. ' '6 The Committee felt so strongly on the issue that it completely
deleted the residual exceptions from the proposed legislation.7 Final-
ly, after the Senate and Conference Committees reinstated the excep-
tions and Congress enacted the Rules, 8 the controversy has reap-
peared in the courts.
In four recent cases the federal courts have grappled with the
question of the appropriate scope of judicial discretion under the
residual hearsay exceptions. In Lowery v. Maryland,9 United States
v. Medico,'0 and United States v. Mathis," the courts opted for the
view that the exceptions have a relatively narrow scope. In these
3. Id. 803(24) & 804(b)(5).
4. Id. 803(24).
5. A Discussion of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 48 F.R.D. 39, 55
(1969).
6. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1973), quoted in ALI-ABA Comi.
ON CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION, RESOURCE MATERIALS-FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE 351,358 (1975) [ALI-ABA Comm. ON CONTINUING PROFESSION-
AL EDUCATION, RESOURCE MATERIAL S-FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE is hereinaf-
ter cited as RESOURCE MATERIALS].
7. Id. at 5-6, quoted in RESOURCE MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 357-58.
8. FED. R. Evm. 803(24) & 804(b)(5).
9. 401 F. Supp. 604 (D. Md. 1975).
10. 557 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1977).
11. 559 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1977).
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cases, the courts reiterated the Senate Committee's language that the
exceptions should rarely be used and only in exceptional circum-
stances.12 By contrast, in United States v. American Cyanamid Co.,
13
the court expressly repudiated the view that the residual exceptions
may be used only in exceptional cases. 4 The Federal Rules of Evi-
dence News accurately reported that the lower federal courts "vary
widely" on the issue of the residual exceptions' scope.'"
This controversy is significant for three reasons. First, the hearsay
article, Article VIII, is one of the most important parts of the new
federal rules. It is the lengthiest article in the federal rules. 6 It is also
12. United States v. Mathis, 559 F.2d 294, 299 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Medico, 557 F.2d 309, 315 (2d Cir. 1977); Lowery v. Maryland, 401 F. Supp. 604,
608 (D. Md. 1975). One commentator has suggested that United States v. Oates,
560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977), also stands for the proposition that the residual
exceptions are "to be used only in unusual and exceptional cases and that they
not serve as a facile end run around the more traditional exceptions." [1977] 2
FED. R. EVID. NEWS 77-87 (Callaghan & Co.). However, this suggestion overstates
the holding in Oates. In Oates, a drug prosecution, the trial judge permitted the
prosecutor to introduce a government chemist's official report and worksheet
identifying the analyzed substance as heroin. The court did not deal with the
general scope of the residual exceptions. Rather, the court first held that the
documents were inadmissible under Rule 803(8) governing admissibility of offi-
cial records. Rule 803(8) reads:
(8) Public records and reports.-Records, reports, statements, or data
compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A)
the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to
duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report,
excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police offi-
cers and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and
proceedings and against the Government in criminal- cases, factual
findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority
granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circum-
stances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
FED. R. EviD. 803(8) (emphasis added). The court reasoned that Rules 803(8)(B)
and (C) mandated the documents' exclusion; under Rule 803(8)(B) the analysis
by a Customs Service chemist is an inadmissible "matter observed by ... law
enforcement personnel," and Rule 803(8)(C) implies that the government cannot
use factual findings such as the identification of a contraband drug against a
defendant in a criminal case. 560 F.2d at 67-68. The court secondly held that the
legislative history of Rules 803 and 804 requires that evaluative police reports
excluded under Rule 803(8) be automatically inadmissible under all other sub-
sections. Id. at 69-78. The court did not discuss the meaning of the "comparable
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" requirement in the residual ex-
ceptions. In fact, the government did not argue on appeal that the evidence fell
within Rule 803(24). Id. at 72. The court's footnote discussion of Rule 803(24)
centered on the subsection's notice requirement rather than the evidence's trust-
worthiness. Id. at 72 n.30.
13. 427 F. Supp. 859 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
14. Id. at 865-66.
15. [1977] 2 FED. R. Evm. NEWS 77-48 (Callaghan & Co.).
16. Schwartz, The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: An Introduction and
Critique, 38 U. Cin. L. REv. 449, 475 (1969).
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one of the most innovative articles, engrafting new exceptions onto
the federal hearsay rule,17 and liberalizing the requirements for sev-
eral recognized exceptions.' 8
Second, the residual exceptions epitomize the essential dilemma of
the effort to codify federal evidence law; like the federal rules as a
whole, the exceptions attempt to attain the goals of standardizing
federal evidence practice while affording the trial judge sufficient
discretion and flexibility to do justice in exceptional cases. Judge
Friendly has remarked that evidence law does not lend itself to
codification. 19 Citing his remark, Representative Holtzman opposed
the residual exceptions.2" She commented:
The problems with rule 803(24) illustrate the serious reservations I
have about codification of rules of evidence. This provision recognizes
that it is impossible to codify the hearsay exceptions. Instead of per-
mitting, by statute, any kind of hearsay to be used, we ought to have
allowed courts to develop evidentiary principles on a case-by-case
basis-as they have done for 200 years of our Federal history.
21
Representative Holtzman's comment highlights the tension between
the drafters' two goals: The more discretion and flexibility the excep-
tions grant the trial judge, the less uniformity and standardization
the Rules will promote. The controversy over the residual exceptions
raises the question whether there is so much tension between the two
goals that the only possible resolution is to give the exceptions a
severely narrow construction.
Third, the controversy affects the state courts as well as the federal
courts. Eleven states have already adopted the federal rules in whole
or large part.22 The state versions of the residual exceptions are as
broad as or broader than the version Congress finally enacted.
2 3
This Article first summarizes the common law view of the trial
judge's power to recognize new hearsay exceptions. Next, the Article
traces the legislative history of the residual exceptions. The author
then analyzes the decided cases construing the exceptions. Finally,
the Article discusses the question whether the courts should limit
17. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 803(1) (present sense impression); id. 803(18) (learn-
ed treatise).
18. See, e.g., id. 803(4) (statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treat-
ment); id. 803(6) (records of regularly conducted activity); id. 804(b)(3) (state-
ment against interest).
19. H. R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1973), quoted in RESOURCE
MATERIALS, supra note 6,-at" 380 (separate views of Hon. Elizabeth Holtzman,
quoting Judge Friendly).
20. Id. at 16-18, quoted in RESOURCE MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 378-80.
21. 120 CONG. REc. 40892-93 (1974), reprinted in RESOURCE MATERIALS, supra
note 6, at 385.
22. [1977] 2 FED. R. EvID. NEwS 77-41 & 77-77 (Callaghan & Co.).
23. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 803-28 (1976). Nevada
and Wisconsin are examples of states with broad residual hearsay exceptions.
Zd.
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Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) to hearsay statements with extraordinary
probative value. The thesis of this Article is that sound statutory
construction dictates the rejection of that limitation.
THE TRIAL JUDGE'S COMION LAW POWER TO
RECOGNIZE NEW HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS
The hearsay rule is a familiar, common law doctrine.24 The doctrine
teaches that assertive, extra-judicial statements and acts are gener-
'ally incompetent to prove the assertion's truthY5 We exclude such
declarations because the opponent has not had an opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant to test his or her perception, memory,
narration, and sincerity.26 Although the hearsay evidence may be
"fair on its face," the evidence carries probative "dangers that could
be exposed or eliminated by cross-examination."27
Of course, the common law judges realized that it would be intoler-
able to formulate an absolute, categorical rule. Consequently, they
recognized numerous exceptions to the rule, notably former tes-
timony,28 admissions of a party-opponent, 29 declarations against in-
terest, 30 dying declarations, 31 excited utterances,32 past recollection
recorded,33 business entries, 34 and official records.35 Since the rule's
crystallization in the late 1600's, 36 these exceptions have all become
well-settled case law doctrines.
In addition to recognizing these specific, well-settled exceptions,
the common law recognizes a residual discretion in the trial judge to
create new exceptions. The forte of the common law system has
always been its capacity for evolving new doctrines based on ac-
cumulated judicial experience. We have witnessed that capacity in
operation during the past few decades. The Texas courts' experience
with the excited utterance doctrine led them to fashion a new excep-
24. C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 579-613 (2d ed. 1972).
25. Id.
26. E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF STATE AND FEDERAL EVIDENCE LAW 223-29
(5th ed. J. Weinstein 1976).
27. Id. at 227.
28. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 614-27 (2d ed. 1972).
29. Id. at 628-69.
30. Id. at 670-79.
31. Id. at 680-85.
32. Id. at 686-711.
33. Id. at 712-16.
34. Id. at 717-34.
35. Id. at 735-42.
36. Id. at 581-84.
tion for present sense impressions.37 The emergence of the present
sense impression exception is another illustration of the exercise of
the trial judge's residual discretion at common law.
Wigmore, the great rationalist of evidence law, attempted to sys-
tematize the hearsay exceptions and incidentally provide a basis for
predictable, future exercise of the residual discretion. After review-
ing the various exceptions, he identified two common de-
nominators. 38 One denominator was the principle of circumstantial
probability of trustworthiness, the other was the principle of necessi-
ty.3 9 As Wigmore must have realized, this scheme not only served to
rationalize the exceptions but also provided criteria for the exercise
of the trial judge's residual discretion: The judge should exercise that
discretion only when the declaration, although not falling within a
recognized exception, is nevertheless supported by a circumstantial
probability of trustworthiness and there is some necessity for in-
troducing the hearsay evidence.
40
The New Hampshire courts were apparently the first to convert
Wigmore's two principles into criteria governing the exercise of the
discretion to create new exceptions. 41 During the 1950's, they em-
ployed "a broad formula of necessity plus apparent trustworthi-
ness" 42 as the basis for admitting declarations which fell outside
recognized hearsay exceptions. For example, in Gagnon v. Pronov-
ost,43 the Supreme Court of New Hampshire upheld the admission of
a private memorandum book. The court acknowledged that the book
did not qualify as a business entry, but it reasoned that the book's
"apparent trustworthiness" 44 warranted its admission. Later in the
same decade, in Perry v. Parker,45 the New Hampshire court sus-
tained the admission of a twenty-five year old surveyor's plan. The
court freely conceded that the plan did not satisfy the thirty year test
of antiquity for ancient documents. However, citing its previous
37. Houston Oxygen Co., Inc. v. Davis, 139 Tex. 1, 161 S.W.2d 474 (1942);
Claybrook v. Acreman, 373 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963); Anderson v. State,
454 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970). See generally C. McCoRMICK, supra note
24, at 709-11.
38. 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1420 (3d ed. 1940); Note, Evidence: Hearsay:
Admissibility of Ancient Newspaper to Prove Matters of Local Interest: Dallas
County v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961), 46 CORNELL
L.Q. 645, 647 (1961).
39. 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1420 (3d ed. 1940).
40. Note, Evidence: Hearsay: Admissibility of Ancient Newspaper to Prove
Matters of Local Interest: Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 286
F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961), 46 CORNELL L.Q. 645, 649 (1961).
41. Maguire, The Hearsay System: Around and Through the Thicket, in
ESSAYS ON PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 51-52 (T. Roady & R. Covington eds. 1961).
42. Id. at 52.
43. 97 N.H. 500, 92 A.2d 904 (1952).
44. Id. at 502-03, 92 A.2d at 905.
45. 101 N.H. 295, 141 A.2d 883 (1958).
[VOL. 15: 239, 1978] Residual Hearsay
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
decision in Gagnon, the court asserted that the plan's admission was
"sensible."46 The New Hampshire courts' progressive approach soon
found adherents in other states such as New York.
47
During the 1960's, this approach also found support in the federal
courts,48 as they, too, asserted the power to create new hearsay ex-
ceptions.49 In one case, when the declarant was ill at the time of trial,
the court admitted a stenographer's transcript of an examination of
an out-of-court declarant under oath by revenue agents.50 In another
case, the court admitted a private check record even though the
record technically did not qualify as a business entry.51 In still
another case, the court admitted testimony about a police officer's
dying declaration statement at a hospital, 52 holding that it was un-
necessary to decide whether the statement qualified as a dying decla-
ration or excited utterance.53 Rather, the court admitted the tes-
timony on the straightforward rationale that the testimony was "fun-
damentally reliable" and conformed to "the general policies underly-
ing the exceptions to the hearsay rule.
5 4
Several federal cases explicitly used Wigmore's criteria of trust-
worthiness and necessity. In United States v. Barbati,15 Judge Wein-
46. Id. at 297, 141 A.2d at 884.
47. Fleury v. Edwards, 14 N.Y.2d 334, 200 N.E.2d 550, 251 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1964).
48. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 23, at 803-244-47.
49.' Note, Evidence-Government Advisory Materials Exception to Hearsay
Rule, 27 MERCER L. REV. 1219, 1220-21 (1976).
50. United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 1134 (10th Cir. 1969).
51. Sabatino v. Curtiss Nat'l Bank of Miami, 415 F.2d 632 (5th Cir. 1969).
52. United States v. Kearney, 420 F.2d 170, 174-75 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
53. Id. at 175.
54. Id.
55. 284 F. Supp. 409 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). The government charged Barbati with
passing counterfeit money to a barmaid to pay for several drinks. At trial, the
barmaid could not identify Barbati. Judge Weinstein permitted a police officer
to testify to the barmaid's pretrial identification of the defendant.
The statement of the barmaid identifying defendant was spontaneous-
ly made within a few moments of the time the bill was passed and
while defendant was still in his place at the bar. It is unlikely that her
observation of the man who gave her the bill was mistaken-he was
awaiting her return with his change. There was no time for lapse of
memory. No reason for her to lie was suggested; in any event, any
motive she might have had to falsify, would not have been substantial-
ly different at the trial than it was at the time of the event. The process
of pointing out the defendant was so simple that an error in communi-
cation was improbable. The barmaid was unlikely to have remained
silent if the police had collared an innocent bystander rather than the
man she intended to point out.
Id. at 412-13.
stein admitted a witness' pretrial identification of the accused. The
judge declared that it was "the current clear tendency" in federal
courts to admit "necessary and trustworthy hearsay." 56 In Butler v.
Southern Pacific Co.,5 7 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
characterized contemporary federal practice as "liberal" and analy-
zed a report's admissibility in terms of trustworthiness and necessi-
ty.58 Finally, in Chestnut v. Ford Motor Co.,69 the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit specifically cited Wigmore,6 0 observing that
"the modem trend" is to "concentrate on" Wigmore's two principles
in deciding the admissibility of evidence that does not fall within a
well-settled exception.6'
Easily the most famous federal case embracing Wigmore's criteria
is Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co. 62 In Dallas
County, the county sued its insurer when the county courthouse
collapsed. The county alleged that lightning struck the courthouse.
Lightning was a risk within the policy's coverage. The county in-
troduced evidence that there were charred timbers among the debris.
The insurer contended that the collapse was attributable to an ex-
cluded risk, the courthouse's structural weakness. To explain the
presence of the charred timbers, the insurer offered a copy of the
June 9, 1901, Selma Morning Times. The copy contained an article
describing a fire at the courthouse which was then under construc-
tion. The trial judge admitted the copy, and the county attacked the
ruling on appeal.
Judge Wisdom, the author of the opinion, echoed the "sensible"
approach of the New Hampshire court 63 by stating that there is no
legal "canon against the exercise of common sense in deciding the
admissibility of hearsay evidence." 64 Citing Wigmore,65 the judge
analyzed the paper's admissibility in terms of trustworthiness and
necessity. He found it "inconceivable ... that a newspaper reporter
in a small town would report there was a fire in the dome on the new
courthouse-if there had been no fire. He was without motive to
falsify, and a false report would have subjected... him to embar-
rassment in the community. ' 6 He likewise found necessity, for the
long time lapse made it unlikely that any witness with personal
56. Id. at 412.
57. 431 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1970).
58. Id. at 80.
59. 445 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1971).
60. Id. at 972 n.5.
61. Id.
62. 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961).
63. See notes 45-46 and accompanying text supra.
64. '286 F.2d at 397.
65. Id. at 395-96.
66. Id. at 397.
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knowledge of the 1901 fire would be available. 67 Judge Wisdom
refused to premise the paper's admissibility on the business entry
doctrine or the ancient document rule or "any other. . . happily
tagged species of hearsay exception." 68 Rather, hechose the rationale
that the paper was "necessary and trustworthy" evidence.
69
In summary, prior to the federal rules, it was clear that a federal
trial judge had the power to recognize new hearsay exceptions.70 The
courts were using Wigmore's two principles to determine when they
should exercise discretion in favor of admitting hearsay falling out-
side traditional exceptions,7 ' and the courts had taken a liberal, 2
flexible7 3 approach in applying the two principles. The emergence of
this approach coincided with the beginning of the consideration of
the Federal Rules of Evidence. The coincidence would force Congress
to reach this question: Should the Rules expand, preserve, contract,
or eliminate the federal trial judge's common law power to recognize
new hearsay exceptions?
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE RESIDUAL HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS
IN THE FEDERAL RuLus OF EVIDENCE
The first formal draft of the residual exceptions appeared in
1969.74 The language of this preliminary draft was far broader than
the language Congress finally enacted:
(a) General Provisions. A statement is not excluded by the hearsay
rule if its nature and the special circumstances under which it was
made offer assurances of accuracy not likely to be enhanced by call-
ing the declarant as a witness, even though he is available.
(b) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by way of limita-
tion, the following are examples of statements conforming with the
requirements of the rule.
75
The most important reaction to the original draft was the criticism
67. Id. at 396-97.
68. Id. at 398.
69. Id.
70. Hassan v. Stafford, 472 F.2d 88,94 (3d Cir. 1973); Note, Evidence-Govern-
ment Advisory Materials Exception to Hearsay Rule, 27 MERCER L. REV. 1219
(1976).
71. See notes 39-69 and accompanying text supra.
72. Butler v. Southern Pacific Co., 431 F.2d 77, 80 (5th Cir. 1970).
73. Note, Evidence-Government Advisory Materials Exception to Hearsay
Rule, 27 MERCER L. REV. 1219, 1221 (1976); Comment, A Practitioner's Guide to
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 10 U. RICH. L. REV. 169, 172 (1975).
74. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States
District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161 (1969); Evans, Article Eight of the
Federal Rules of Evidence: The Hearsay Rule, 8 VAL. U.L. REV. 261,267 (1974).
75. 4 J. W NSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 23, at 803-241.
of the Committee of New York Trial Lawyers.76 On the one hand, the
Committee expressed concern that the preliminary draft would
minimize predictability of evidentiary rulings and increase hazards
of trial preparation-by giving the trial judge too much discretion.
77
On the other hand, the Committee believed that the trial judge needs
some flexibility and discretion.78 For that reason, the Committee
proposed this language:
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing excep-
tions but having equivalent circumstantial probability of trustworthi-
ness; provided that the proponent's intention to offer the statement
was made known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the
trial or hearing to provide him with a fair opportunity to prepare to
meet it.
79
The Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules concluded that the
proposal had merit. In the main, when the Advisory Committee is-
sued its revised 1971 draft,80 it adopted the New York Committee's
language.81 There were, however, two differences between the drafts.
First, the Advisory Committee substituted "comparable" for "equiv-
alent" circumstantial probability of trustworthiness. 82 Second, the
Advisory Committee omitted any requirement for pretrial notice.
83
The Advisory Committee then submitted its draft to the United
States Supreme Court.
The Advisory Committee's Notes accompanying the final draft
reflect the controversy over the appropriate scope of judicial discre-
tion under the residual exceptions. At the outset, the Committee
points out that it had seriously discussed then Professor Weinstein's
proposal for the abolition of class exceptions and the adoption of
individual treatment of hearsay evidence with procedural safe-
guards.84 However, the Committee quickly adds that it ultimately
"rejected this approach . . . as involving too great a measure of
76. Waltz, Present Sense Impressions, and the Residual Exceptions: A New
Dav for "Great" Hearsay? 2 LITIGATION 22 (1975).
77. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 23, at 803-241; Waltz, Present
Sense Impressions and the Residual Exceptions: A New Day for "Great"Irear-
say?, 2 LITIGATION 22 (1975).
78. See authorities cited note 77 supra.
79. Waltz, Present Sense Impressions and the Residual Exceptions: A New
Day for "Great" Hearsay?, 2 LITIGATION 22, 23 (1975).
80. Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States
Courts and Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315 (1971); Evans, Article Eight of the Feder-
al Rules of Evidence: The Hearsay Rule, 8 VAL. U.L. REv. 261, 265 (1974).
81. Waltz, Article VIt: The Hearsay Rule and Its Exceptions, in RESOURCE
MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 259, 263.
82. Waltz, Present Sense Impre.sions and the Residual Exceptions: A New
Day for "Great" Hearsay?, 2 LITIGATION 22, 23 (1975).
83. Id.
84. FED. R. EviD. 801-806 Advisory Comm. Notes (Introductory Note: The
Hearsay Problem). See Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IowA L. REV.
331 (1961).
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judicial discretion, minimizing the predictability of rulings, [and]
enhancing the difficulties of preparation for trial. '8 5 The Committee
set its face against "an unfettered exercise of judicial discretion.
'8 6
Yet, in the same breath, the Committee states that it realized that
the judge needs discretion in "presently unanticipated situations.
'87
The Committee concludes by citing Dallas County as an example of
the sort of discretion the residual exceptions grant the trial judge.
88
Over Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent, the Supreme Court approved the
rules on November 20, 1972, and ordered that they take effect on July
1, 1973.89 Congress intervened before the Rules took effect; it passed
Public Law 93-12, deferring the Rules' effectiveness until Congress
positively enacted the Rules.90
The House was first to consider the Rules. The House referred the
Rules to the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the House Commit-
tee on the Judiciary. 91 The Subcommittee prepared House Report 93-
650, recommending that Congress delete the residual exceptions.9 "
The report gave two reasons for the recommendation. The first was
that now familiar argument that the exceptions would inject "too
much uncertainty into the law of evidence and [impair] the ability of
practitioners to prepare for trial. ' 93 The second was that proposed
Rule 102 would give the trial judge sufficient flexibility.94 That Rule
directs trial judges to construe the Rules "to secure fairness in ad-
ministration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and
promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the
end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly deter-
mined."9 5 The Subcommittee believed that given Rule 102, the courts





89. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183
(1972); Rothstein, The Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence,
62 GEo. L.J. 125 (1973).
90. H. R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1973), quoted in RESOURCE
MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 356.
91. K. REDDEN & S. SALTZBURG, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 307
(1975).
92. Waltz, Rule 803-Hearsay Exceptions:Availability ofDeclarant Immate-
rial, in THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE IN Camm'rAL MATTERS 13,40 (J. LaRos-
sa Chmn. 1977).
93. H. R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1973), quoted in RESOURCE
MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 358.
94. Id.
95. FED. R. Evm. 102.
would construe the enumerated exceptions with such liberality that
any additional exceptions were unnecessary. The House adopted the
Subcommittee's recommendation by passing House Resolution 5463
deleting the residual exceptions. 6
The Senate then took up the question of the Federal Rules. The
Senate Judiciary Committee prepared its own report on the Rules.
0 7
In part, the Senate Report concurred with the House Report, caution-
ing against granting trial judges "broad license" 98 or "unbridled
discretion." 99 The Report stated: "The Committee ... agrees with
those supporters of the House version who felt that an overly broad
residual hearsay exception could emasculate the hearsay rule and the
recognized exceptions or vitiate the rationale behind codification of
the rules."'100
However, on balance, the Senate Report concluded that a nar-
rowed version of the residual exceptions should be reinstated. 1 1 The
Senate Report cited two reasons for its recommendation. First, Rule
102 gave trial judges insufficient flexibility.102 The Senate Report
cited two of the most liberal common law decisions, Dallas County
and Barbati,'103 and stated that Dallas County "illustrates" the quan-
tum of discretion the trial judge needs. 0 4 Second, the Committee
feared that unless it supplemented Rule 102 with residual exceptions,
trial judges would "torture" the enumerated exceptions "beyond any
reasonable circumstances which they were intended to include (even
if broadly construed)."' 5 The Committee conjectured that trial
judges would find the discretion under Rule 102 intolerably narrow
and would be forced to strain the text of the enumerated exceptions
to cope with unanticipated situations.
In its report, the Senate Judiciary Committee offered the following
proposed language to the Senate as a whole:
96. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974), quoted in RESOURCE AITE-
RIALS, supra note 6, at 326.
97. Id. at 18-20, quoted in RESOURCE MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 338-40.
98. Id. at 20, quoted in RESOURCE MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 340.
99. Id. at 8, quoted in RESOURCE MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 328.





105. Id. United States v. Napier, 518 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1975), seems to confirm
the Committee's fear. The case was decided prior to the Rules' effective date.
The victim had been beaten severely. While she was in the hospital, her sister
showed her a newspaper photograph of the defendant. She exclaimed, "He
killed me, he killed me." The court admitted this identification on the theory that
it was an excited utterance. The difficulty is that the utterance related to an
event which had occurred weeks before. For a criticism of this decision, see K.
REDDEN & S. SALTZBURG, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 143 (Supp. 1976).
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(24) OTHER EXCEPTIONS.-A statement specifically covered by
any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness,, if the court determines that (i) the
statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (ii) the statement is
more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other
evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable ef-
forts; and (iii) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of
justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evi-
dence.
10 6
The language thus established four requirements for invoking the
residual exceptions: an equivalent guarantee of trustworthiness and
the three numbered requirements. 10 7 To assuage the supporters of the
exceptions' deletion, the Committee stated that its language had
"much narrower scope and applicability than the Supreme Court
version."'1 8 The Committee added that it intended that the excep-
tions would be employed "very rarely, and only in exceptional cir-
cumstances." 10 9 The Senate adopted the proposed language in late
1974.110
The disagreement between the House and Senate necessitated re-
ferring the Rules to the Conference Committee. The Conference Com-
mittee was persuaded by the Senate arguments favoring the rein-
statement of the residual exceptions."' However, the Committee, at
the urging of the District of Columbia Committee with Respect to
Article VyI," 2 added a fifth requirement: pretrial notice of the pro-
ponent's intention to rely on a residual exception." 3 With the addi-
tion of this fifth requirement, the residual exceptions took their
present form.
The Conference Committee resubmitted the legislation to the Sen-
ate and House. During the House debate, Representative Holtzman
stated her opposition to the residual exceptions and styled them
106. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1974), quoted in RESOURCE MATE-
RiALS, supra note 6, at 323.
107. Id. at 19-20, quoted in RESOURCE MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 339-40; 4 J.
WEiEsTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 23, at 803-30-31.
108. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1974), quoted in RESOURCE
MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 339.
109. Id. at 20, quoted in RESOURCE MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 340.
110. The Senate Report is dated October 18, 1974. RESOURCE MATERIALS, SUP-
ra note 6, at 319. The Conference Report was finalized by December 14, 1974. Id.
at 303.
111. CoNF. REP. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1974), quoted in RESOURCE
MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 315; 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 23, at
803-31.
112. Rothstein, The Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, 62 Geo. L.J. 125, 157 n.167 (1973).
113. CONF. REP. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1974), quoted in RESOURCE
as "casual, [and] open-ended.""14 She claimed that even the Confer-
ence Committee's version "basically abolishes the rule against hear-
say and leaves it to the discretion of every judge to let in any kind of
hearsay he wants.""' 5 Notwithstanding Representative Holtzman's
vigorous opposition, the House and Senate adopted the compromise
language hammered out in the Conference Committee. Like the other
provisions of the Federal Rules, the residual exceptions took effect on
July 1, 1975, by virtue of Public Law 93-595.116
THE JUDICIAL GLoss ON THE RESIDUAL HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS
IN THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
Some commentators predicted that the controversy over the re-
sidual exceptions' scope would prove unimportant because there
would be very few cases applying the exceptions." 7 This prediction
has proved inaccurate; there are now a fair number of cases inter-
preting the exceptions."' Thus, there is a sufficient body of case law
to permit some generalization about the major trends in the courts'
application of the residual exceptions.
For the most part, the cases construing the residual exceptions
assume sub silentio that even after the Rules' adoption, the courts
have the same degree of discretion to admit hearsay which does not
fall within an orthodox exception. On several occasions, the courts
have used pre-Rule precedents to define the scope of discretion under
MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 315-16; K. REDDEN & S. SALTZBURG, FEDERAL RULES
OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 329 (1975); 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 23, at
803-243.
114. 120 CONG. REC. 40892-93 (1974), reprinted in RESOURCE MATERIALS, supra
note 6, at 385.
115. Id.
116. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 1, 88 Stat. 1926, quoted in
RESOURCE MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 277. See Comment, A Practitioner's
Guide to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 10 U. RICH. L. REV. 169 (1975).
117. Waltz, Rule 803-Hearsay Exceptions: Availability of Declarant Im-
material, in FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE IN CRIMNAL MATTERS 13,41 (J. LaRos-
sa Chmn. 1977); Waltz, Present Sense Impressions and the Residual Exceptions:
A New Day for "Great" Hearsay?, 2 LITIGATION 22, 24 (1975).
118. See, e.g., United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977); United States
v. Gonzalez, 559 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Mathis, 559 F.2d 294
(5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Medico, 557 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1977); United States
v. Ward, 552 F.2d 1080 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346 (8th
Cir. 1976); United States v. Homer, 545 F.2d 864 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v.
Leslie, 542 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. laconetti, 540 F.2d 574 (2d
Cir. 1976); United States v. Pfeiffer, 539 F.2d 668 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Gomez, 529 F.2d 412 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Yates, 524 F.2d 1282 (D.C.
Cir. 1975); Muncie Aviation Corp. v. Party Doll Fleet, Inc., 519 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir.
1975); United States v. Napier, 518 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v.
American Cyanamid Co., 427 F. Supp. 859 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); United States v.
laconetti, 406 F. Supp. 554 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Lowery v. Maryland, 401 F. Supp. 604
(D. Md. 1975); Arrow Hart, Inc. v. Covert Hills, Inc., 71 F.R.D. 346 (E.D. Ky. 1976);
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the residual exceptions. As previously stated,119 Chestnut v. Ford
Motor Co.12 is one of the leading pre-Rule precedents for the liberal
admission of hearsay under Wigmore's criteria. This decision was
cited in United States v. Carlson"' in explicating Rule 804(b)(5).
121
Of course, Dallas County is the most famous pre-Rule precedent. 123 In
United States v. Gomez,124 Ark-Mo Farms, Inc. v. United States,"
25
and Muncie Aviation Corp. v. Party Doll Fleet, Inc.,126 the courts
referred to Dallas County in analyzing Rule 803(24). Muncie is un-
doubtedly the most significant case; like the Dallas County opinion
itself, Muncie was authored by Judge Wisdom. Muncie was decided
before the effective date of the Federal Rules. Judge Wisdom prem-
ised the decision admitting Federal Aviation Administration adviso-
ry circulars on Dallas County,12 7 but he added that "additional sup-
port is lent the decision today by Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) of the
new Federal Rules of Evidence."'
28
Even when the cases construing the residual exceptions do not
explicitly cite Dallas County or Chestnut, they exhibit the pre-Rule
tendency to place primary emphasis on the testimonial quality of
sincerity in determining the admissibility of hearsay. 2 9 It is true that
the common law recognized four testimonial qualities or sources of
error: perception, memory, narration, and sincerity."' However, in
developing the common law exceptions, the courts placed primary
emphasis on sincerity; if the circumstances supported an inference
that the declarant was speaking sincerely, the court was likely to
admit the declaration."'
The cases construing Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) display the same
tendency. For example, in Muncie, Judge Wisdom stressed that the
circulars were prepared by a "governmental agency whose only con-
Workman v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 68 F.R.D. 562 (N.D. Ohio 1975); Ark-Mo
Farms, Inc. v. United States, 530 F.2d 1384 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
119. See notes 59-61 and accompanying text supra.
120. 445 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1971).
121. 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976).
122. Id. at 1354.
123. See notes 62-69 and accompanying text supra.
124. 529 F.2d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 1976).
125. 530 F.2d 1384, 1387 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
126. 519 F.2d 1178, 1182-84 (5th Cir. 1975).
127. Id. at 1182.
128. Id. at 1184.
129. See notes 203-11 and accompanying text infra.
130. E. MORGAN, BAsIC PROBLEMS OF STATE AND FEDERAL EVIDENCE LAW 223-
29 (5th ed. J. Weinstein 1976).
131. See notes 203-11 and accompanying text infra.
ceivable interest was in insuring safety."'132 In Carlson, the court
admitted the grand jury testimony of an unavailable witness.1 33 The
court mentioned some guarantees of accurate perception and mem-
ory, but most of the indicia of trustworthiness listed by the court
related to the declarant's sincerity.134 This emphasis on the quality of
sincerity is also manifested in United States v. American Cyanamid
Co. 135 There the court ruled in favor of the admission of correspond-
ence between certain producers and the Department of Justice. The
only guarantee of trustworthiness the court identified was the fact
that the producers authoring the letters probably would not lie in
response to an official, government inquiry.'36
Cases excluding hearsay under the residual exceptions also focus
on sincerity. One of the first cases rejecting evidence offered under
Rule 804(b)(5) was Workman v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co.13 In Work-
man, a party offered an eyewitness' statement which had been pre-
pared by an attorney. The court's doubts about the evidence's trust-
worthiness centered on the sincerity of the lawyer. 38 Similarly, in
United States v. Yates, 39 the ruling excluding hearsay was based on
doubts about the declarant's sincerity. The defendant raised an alibi;
he had been with Jones all evening. The trial judge admitted a police
officer's testimony that while in the police car, Jones said he had
been with Yates for only five minutes. The court stated that there was
"little likelihood of a perception or memory problem."' 40 However,
the court inferred from the circumstances that Jones was primarily
interested in exculpating himself and therefore concluded that its
132. Muncie Aviation Corp. v. Party Doll Fleet, Inc., 519 F.2d 1178, 1182 (5th
Cir. 1975).
133. United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976).
134. There is strong indication of reliability in Tindall's testimony. His
statements were made under oath and any misrepresentation or deliber-
ate falsehood might subject Tindall to the sanctions of perjury. Tindall
was relating facts surrounding a cocaine transaction in which he partici-
pated and of which he possessed firsthand knowledge; therefore, there
was no reliance upon potential erroneous secondary information and
the possibility of faulty recollection was minimized. Moreover, Tindall
never recanted his grand jury testimony or expressed any belated reser-
vations as to its accuracy. Rather, he specifically stated at the time of
trial that he told the truth to the grand jury.
Id. at 1354.
135. 427 F. Supp. 859 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
136. Id. at 865.
137. 68 F.R.D. 562 (N.D. Ohio 1975).
138. The Court is well aware of the subtle shifts in meaning that can occur
when one's statement is recorded by another. Such changes can be
wholly unintentional, and without impugning at all the integrity of the
attorney who took Mr. Stratton's statement, he was hardly a disinterest-
ed observer. The lawyer took that statement for the purpose of accident
investigation with an eye towards litigation.
Id. at 564.
139. 524 F.2d 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
140. Id. at 1286.
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"grave doubts. . . as to the sincerity of the self-serving statement"
mandated the hearsay's exclusion.
4 1
United States v. Gonzalez142 also stressed the factor of sincerity.
Like Carlson, Gonzalez involved the grand jury testimony of an
unavailable witness. However, distinguishing Carlson, the court
found several indicia of untrustworthiness: The prosecutor elicited
the testimony before the grand jury by leading questions; when the
witness refused to answer even after immunity, the prosecutor
threatened to repeatedly call the witness before successive grand
juries and give the witness "an unlimited number of. . . six-month
contempt sentences."'1 43 The court concluded that because of the
prosecutor's pressure, the witness subjectively desired "to come up
with an answer, whether or not it was true."' 44
Although the decided cases indicate that most judges believe they
have retained their pre-Rule residual discretion, the courts have
applied the residual exceptions cautiously. The courts have often
cited the exceptions as merely an alternative basis for admission. In
Ark-Mo Farms, the court admitted a hydrological report prepared by
the Corps of Engineers and invoked both the shopbook doctrine and
the residual exceptions. 45 In United States v. Pfeiffer,146 the court
sustained the admission of certain delivery invoices. The court ar-
gued that the invoices were admissible under both Rule 803(6)'s
business entry exception and the residual exceptions. In the most
interesting case, United States v. Iaconetti,47 the defendant was
charged with soliciting a bribe from Lioi. At trial, Lioi testified to the
solicitation, and the defendant flatly denied the solicitation. Judge
Weinstein then permitted the government to introduce the rebuttal
testimony of Lioi's partner and attorney that Lioi had mentioned the
solicitation to them. Judge Weinstein is hardly diffident on eviden-
tiary questions.'48 Yet he cited Rules 801(d)(1) and 801(d)(2)(C) as
well as 803(24) in justifying the admission of the rebuttal evidence.
149
The cautious tone evident in these cases becomes more pronounced
141. Id.
142. 559 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1977).
143. Id. at 1273.
144. Id.
145. 530 F.2d at 1386-87.
146. 539 F.2d 668 (8th Cir. 1976).
147. 406 F. Supp. 554 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
148. See, e.g., Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IowA L. REv. 331
(1961).
149. 406 F. Supp. at 558-60.
in the cases espousing the view that the courts should only rarely use
the residual exceptions. The first case adopting that view was Low-
ery v. Maryland.150 Lowery claimed that the prosecutor had know-
ingly used perjured testimony to secure his conviction. He offered the
affidavit of the state's chief witness that he had given perjured
testimony. Lowery argued that the statement was admissible as a
declaration against interest under Rule 804(b)(3) and under the re-
sidual exception, Rule 804(b)(5). The court first held that the state-
ment did not qualify as a declaration against interest. Citing the
Senate Report, the court then declared: "It was the intent of Congress
that this exception be used rarely and only in exceptional circum-
stances. Since statements such as Dixon's are covered by Rule
804(b)(3), the admissibility cannot be considered under Rule
804(b)(5).''
1 1
Both the majority and dissenting opinions in United States v.
Medico'5 embrace the view that the residual exceptions should rare-
ly be used. A bank robbery had just been committed. A bank employ-
ee, Carmody, was locking the entrance door. A young man in a car
outside the bank gave the getaway car's make and license number to
a bystander who relayed it to Carmody. Carmody saw the young
man's lips move, but he could not hear the young man speak. Once
again Judge Weinstein was presiding. He permitted Carmody to
relate the double hearsay and based his ruling on Rule 803(24). 153 The
majority opinion acknowledged that the Rule's legislative history
indicates that the Rule should rarely be used 54 but found an excep-
tionally strong showing of reliability in the record. 15 5 In dissent,
Judge Mansfield argued that the trial judge erred in admitting the
double hearsay. Like the majority, Judge Mansfield cited the Senate
Report. 5 6 He emphasized that Congress intended that trial judges
would use the residual exceptions "sparingly."' 157 Focusing on the
possible errors in perception and memory, he thought that the young
man in the car or the bystander could easily have misstated the
150. 401 F. Supp. 604 (D. Md. 1975).
151. Id.
152. 557 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1977).
153. Id. at 314.
154. The [Senate] committee report indicates that the provisions are not
intended as "a broad license" to trial judges to admit hearsay but for use
under rare and exceptional circumstances with the trial judge being
admonished to "exercise no less care, reflection and caution than the
courts did under the common law in establishing the now-recognized
exceptions to the hearsay rule."
Id. at 315.
155. Id. at 315-16.
156. Id. at 320.
157. Id.
[VOL. 15: 239, 19781 Residual Hearsay
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
facts.158 Judge Mansfield wanted to rigorously apply the standard
announced in the Senate Report.
The third opinion subscribing to this view is United States v.
Mat his. In Mathis, the prosecution wanted to have government
agents testify to hearsay statements by the defendant's wife and
invoked Rule 803(24). However, because the wife was available as a
witness, the court held that the hearsay testimony was not the most
probative evidence the prosecution could procure; the wife's live
testimony was more probative, and the hearsay was therefore inad-
missible under Rule 803(24)(B)."6 ' The court cited the same legislative
history referenced in Lowery and Medico'6' and stated that "tight
reins must be held" over the residual exceptions.
6 2
In sharp contrast, in United States v. American Cyanamid Co.,
163
the court repudiated the argument that the residual exceptions may
be used only in exceptional cases. The issue was whether American
Cyanamid had violated a consent decree. Under the decree, it had
agreed to limit its melamine production until competitors had in-
creased their "production capacity" by 25,000,000 pounds per year.
The Justice Department had sent melamine producers an inquiry
about the accepted industry meaning of "production capacity."
American Cyanamid wanted to introduce the producers' responses
under Rule 803(24); the government opposed the letters' admission.
Citing the Senate Report, the government contended that Rule
803(24) "was meant to apply only in exceptional cases."' 64 The court
rejected this argument for three reasons. First, on its face the Rule is
not limited to exceptional cases or evidence with extraordinary pro-
bative value. 65 The court believed that the text controlled over the
legislative history. Second, the implication of such a limitation
would be contrary to Rule 102.166 Rule 102 encourages liberal con-
struction of the Rules, and the court felt that the implication of the
158. The young man in the car "may well have erred due to excitement, poor
eyesight, poor lighting conditions or visual obstructions." For his part, the
bystander could have erred because of "faulty hearing, background noise, ex-
citement, and similar circumstances." Id. at 319.
159. 559 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1977).
160. Id. at 298-99.
161. Id. at 299.
162. Id.
163. 427 F. Supp. 859-(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
164. Id. at 865.
165. Id. at 866.
166. Id.
limitation the government urged would "negate the requirement of
Rule 102. ' '167 Finally, the addition of the exceptional case limitation
would add another element of uncertainty to the Rule's application:
"[I]t would bring into each trial, the foot of the Chancellor, an
historical enemy of our liberties.
168
Anyone familiar with the residual exceptions' legislative history
would seriously question the American Cyanamid court's analysis.
The court's last two arguments virtually turned the legislative his-
tory upside down. The House Report argued that Rule 102 provided
sufficient flexibility and made the residual exceptions unneces-
sary.169 Yet the American Cyanamid court invoked Rule 102 to sup-
port a broad construction of the exceptions. Similarly, the court
inveighed against discretion, "an historical enemy of our liberties,"
to support a construction which will give trial judges more rather
than less discretion1n0 The comment is particularly ironic in light of
Judge Friendly's previous attack on the exceptions that they repre-
sented "the Chancellor's foot with a vengeance.' 7' In short, any
supporter of the House Report would find the American Cyanamid
opinion not only unacceptable but infuriating. However, although
the American Cyanamid court's analysis is flawed, it is this, author's
opinion that the American Cyanamid court reached the proper con-
clusion and that the contrary statements in Lowery, Medico, and
Mathis are bad law.
THE PROPER CONSTRUCTION OF THE RESIDUAL HEARSAY
ExCEPTIONS IN TE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
The issue is whether the courts should construe the residual excep-
tions as admitting only evidence with the sort of extraordinary pro-
bative value Judge Mansfield demanded in Medico.17 2 At first blush,
the position of the Lowery, Medico, and Mathis courts seems far
more tenable; the position appears to have a sound basis in the
residual exceptions' legislative history. However, a more realistic
assessment of the exceptions' legislative history leads to the conclu-
sion that those materials can give us little guidance; the legislative
history materials are self-contradictory.
When the legislative history materials "lend great comfort to both
sides," the materials are entitled to little weight in the statute's
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See notes 94-95 and accompanying text supra.
170. 427 F. Supp. at 866.
171. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 23, at 803-27.
172. See notes 156-58 and accompanying text supra.
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construction. 73 In American Chicle Co. v. United States,7 4 the court
was more specific: "[A] legislative history, containing a direct state-
ment of purpose pointing in one direction and an example pointing in
the other, is of no real assistance in interpreting the statute.'
'7 5
The court's comment applies to the legislative history of the residu-
al exceptions. The three courts advocating a narrow construction of
the exceptions relied heavily on Senate Report 93-1277. Admittedly,
the Report explicitly states that the exceptions should be employed
"very rarely and only in exceptional circumstances.' 17 6 However, to
illustrate the appropriate scope of judicial discretion under the ex-
ceptions, the Senate Report cites Dallas County and Barbati.1
77
These two decisions are two of the most liberal common law opinions
on judges' residual discretion. The passage Lowery, Medico, and
Mathis rely on "point[s] in one direction," but the examples "point in
the other." Indeed, the Report hedges on the critical issue. It states
that under the exceptions, federal trial judges are to use "no less
care, reflection, and caution than the courts did under the common
law."'17 8 The Report could have stated that federal trial judges were
to have "less" discretion or the "same" degree of discretion which
judges possessed at common law; either statement would have pro-
vided a forthright answer to the question. Rather, the Senate Report
chose the most ambiguous language possible.
The ambiguity of the Report may be purposeful. The House had
already deleted the residual exceptions' 7 9 If the residual exceptions
were to be reinstated, there would have to be a political compromise
between the House and Senate. On the one hand, foreseeing the
necessity for a future compromise, they had to justify the exceptions'
reinstatement. On the other hand, they had to put their Conferees in a
position to persuade the House Conferees that this draft was more
palatable than the Supreme Court's version the House had already
rejected. At least in part, political expedience accounts for the Senate
173. Dent v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 406 F.2d 399,403 (5th Cir. 1969); 2 J.
SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 5001 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
174. 41 F. Supp. 537 (Ct. C1. 1941), aff'd, 316 U.S. 450 (1942).
175. Id. at 543.
176. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1974), quoted in RESOURCE
MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 340.,
177. Id. at 19, quoted in RESOURCE MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 340.
178. Id. at 20, quoted in RESOURCE MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 340 (emphasis
added).
179. See text accompanying notes 91-96 supra.
Report's statement that its draft is of "much narrower scope and
applicability than the Supreme Court version." 180
If the importance of the exceptions' legislative history may be
discounted, then the conclusion reached in American Cyanamid is
preferable. American Cyanamid's liberal interpretation is a more
literal, a more purposive, and a more reasonable construction of the
residual exceptions.
In the first place, a broad construction of the statutes is more
literal. A statute's text or language is "the best and most reliable
index of its meaning."' 81 The text is entitled to special weight when
the statute's legislative history is ambiguous or contradictory. 8 2 As
the American Cyanamid court noted, the exceptions' text lends sup-
port to the conclusion that they are not to be used "only in exception-
al cases."'' 8 The court emphasized that Rule 803(24) provides the
judge with a detailed list of express criteria. 84 Although the Rule's
language requires that the evidence have an "equivalent circumstan-
tial guarantee of trustworthiness,"'185 "[t]here is no requirement that
the Court find a case to be 'exceptional'. .. in order to receive any
evidence."'
18
The court's argument has substantial merit. The statute's text is
not merely the starting point for statutory construction analysis; the
specific language used should be an important factor. 87 The lan-
guage should have great weight when the statute is a product of
political compromise because then its language has probably been
chosen with special care. The residual exceptions are the product of
political compromise. The Advisory Committee, the Supreme Court,
the- House, the Senate, and the Conference Committee all partici-
pated in a process of compromise and negotiation culminating in the
specific text signed by President Ford. The exceptions' wording is
entitled to great weight, and the proponents of a broad construction
can correctly charge that their opponents would in effect amend the
exceptions' language and add a new requirement for admissibility.
180. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1974), quoted in RESOURCE
MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 339.
181. Department & Specialty Store Employees' Union, Local 1265 v. Brown,
284 F.2d 619, 627 (9th Cir. 1960).
182. 2 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 5001 (Cum.
Supp. 1972).
183. 427 F. Supp. at 865-66.
184. Id. at 866.
185. FED. R. EviD. 803(24).
186. United States v. American Cyanamid Co., 427 F. Supp. 859,866 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
187. St. Joseph Hosp. v. Quinn, 241 Md. 371,216A.2d 732 (1966); E. CRAWFORD,
THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES § 203 (1940) ("Naturally, the first as well as the
best source from which to ascertain the meaning of any statute is the statute
itself.").
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The statute reads "equivalent;" it does not read "exceptional" or
"extraordinarily high."
Furthermore, the broad construction of the statutes is more pur-
posive and consistent with the overall purpose of Article VIII.
Numerous commentators have stated that the primary thrust of Arti-
cle VIII is to liberalize federal hearsay practice. 188 Because courts
should choose the interpretation more consistent with the statute's
primary purpose or thrust,189 a liberal interpretation of Article VIII is
more appropriate.
The enumerated hearsay exceptions generally either maintain the
common law exceptions, liberalize them, or add new exceptions. 90
There are few provisions which can be construed as imposing stricter
requirements than those prevailing at common law. 191 If the courts
adopt the narrow construction of the residual exceptions, the excep-
tions would be narrower than the pre-existing common law discre-
tion. At common law, there was no requirement that the hearsay
statement's probative value be inordinately high or extraordinary;
the courts applied Wigmore's criteria and inquired whether the hear-
say had a guarantee of trustworthiness comparable or analogous to
that of a recognized exception. 92 To accept the narrow construction
of the exceptions would be a step backward; federal trial judges
would then have less discretion than they had at common law. Conse-
quently, given the liberal tone of Article VIH, it would be anomalous
for the courts to opt for a narrow construction of the residual excep-
tions.
188. Evans, Article Eight of the Federal Rules of Evidence: The Hearsay
Rule, 8 VAL. U.L. REV. 261, 300-01 (1974) (the hearsay rule has been "con-
siderably weakened by Article Eight"); Stewart, Perception, Memory, and Hear-
say: A Criticism of Present Law and The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence,
1970 UTAH L. REV. 1, 6-7 ("substantially enlarge the admissibility of hearsay");
Comment, A Practitioner's Guide to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 10 U. RICH.
L. REV. 169, 189-90 (1975) ("significantly expanded the scope of previous com-
mon law exceptions").
189. 73 Am. JuR. 2d Statutes § 153 (1974); 82 C.J.S. Statutes §§ 323, 325 & 351
(1953).
190. See notes 17-18 and accompanying text supra.
191. FED. R. Evm. 803(6) might have such an effect. On its face, the Rule
requires that the entrant or informant be "a person with knowledge." It superse-
des 28 U.S.C.A. § 1732 (West 1966), which in pertinent part read: "All other
circumstances of the making of such writing or record, including lack of person-
al knowledge by the entrant or maker, may be shown to affect its weight, but
they shall not affect its admissibility." Id. (emphasis added). See United States
v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 80 n.33 (2d Cir. 1977).
192. See text accompanying notes 38-69 supra.
Finally, the broad interpretation is a more reasonable construc-
tion. As noted by Professor Davis, with whom other commentators
have concurred,19 3 one of the most irrational features of hearsay law
is that "technically incompetent hearsay is often more reliable than
technically competent evidence."'1 94 The broad construction of the
residual exceptions would eliminate this irrationality because the
liberal interpretation requires only that the declaration have an
"equivalent" circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness. The nar-
row construction, on the other hand, would perpetuate this irration-
ality; it would exclude hearsay even if the hearsay had a comparable
or equivalent guarantee of reliability.
The hearsay statements admitted under the orthodox exceptions
vary greatly in their reliability. There is "an enormous variation in
the guarantee of trustworthiness" among the various traditional ex-
ceptions. 195 Writing in United States v. Iaconetti, Judge Weinstein
stated that "[t]he quality of the factors cited as insuring reliability
for the [traditional] hearsay exceptions range over an entire spec-
trun.'
1 9 6
Rather than ensuring extraordinary reliability, the traditional ex-
ceptions permit the admission of hearsay of frankly dubious reliabil-
ity. In Professor McCormick's terse words, they sanction the admis-
sion of "[m]uch worthless evidence."'1 In the case of some excep-
tions, the guarantee of trustworthiness seems "imagined" rather than
real. 98 On occasion, the common law seemed content with any
guarantee other than the mere fact that the statement had been
made."', .
Professor Morgan was one of the first to expose the suspect nature
of some of the evidence routinely admitted under the traditional
exceptions. 200 For example, he pointed out that the continuity of
state of mind theory overlooks probative memory dangers. 201 Modem
witness psychology has validated Morgan's criticism.20 2 This disci-
193. Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IowA L. REv. 331, 345 (1961).
194. Davis, Evidence Reform: The Administrative Process Leads the Way, 34
MNN. L. REV. 581, 608 (1950).
195. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 23, at 803-242.
196. 406 F. Supp. 554, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
197. C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 300 (1954); Com-
ment, Major Changes Under the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence-Part I,
37 TENN. L. REV. 556, 566 (1970).
198. RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE § 206 (10th ed. 1973).
199. MCKELVEY ON EVIDENCE 301 (3d ed. 1924).
200. E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF STATE AND FEDERAL EVIDENCE LAW 229
(5th ed. 1976).
201. Id.
202. Stewart, Perception, Memory, and Hearsay: A Criticism ofPresent Law
and The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970 UTAH L. REv. 1.
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pline has provided new insights which confirm the high probability
of error in such frequently admitted types of hearsay as excited
utterances.
203
The primary explanation for the relatively low quality and relia-
bility of traditionally admitted hearsay is the common law's obses-
sion with perjury.20 4 There are four distinct probative dangers-
perception, memory, narration, and sincerity. Nevertheless, the com-
mon law courts, in framing the exceptions, focused primarily on
sincerity. 205 For most exceptions, there is no real substitute for a
cross-examiner's ability to probe errors in perception, memory, or
narration; realistically, there is only a substitute for the oath-some
circumstantial inference that the declarant is not consciously ly-
ing.20 6 The hoary exceptions for dying declarations, declarations
against interest, and excited utterances illustrate that the courts
have placed the greatest emphasis on the testimonial quality of sin-
cerity in evolving the traditional exceptions.
207
The courts' emphasis on the probative danger of sincerity has led
them to neglect the probative dangers of perception, memory, and
narration.208 Although "the exceptions. . . have stressed the element
of sincerity . . . , [i]t is believed to be the common experience of
attorneys in the trial of cases, when facts are not accurately reported,
that witnesses are more often found to be mistaken than committing
perjury. °20 9 Empirical, witness psychology studies of the testimonial
process confirm the trial attorney's experience: "[E]rrors and distor-
tion in perception and memory are probably the most important
source of testimonial conflict." 210 The traditional exceptions often
sanction the admission of types of hearsay which witness psychology
tells us are likely to be inaccurate.
2 1'
The traditional exceptions' requirements do not ensure extraordi-
203. Id. at 9, 25-26.
204. Adams, Twin Codes of Evidence: Just Wat the System Ordered, 20
S.D.L. REV. 228 (1975).
205. E. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYS-
TEM OF LITIGATION 139-40 (1956).
206. Id.; Ladd, The Hearsay We Admit, 5 OKLA. L. REV 271, 280-81 (1952).
207. E. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYS-
TEM OF LITIGATION 164-66 (1956).
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209. Id. at 286.
210. Stewart, Perception, Memory, and Hearsay: A Criticism of Present Law
and The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970 UTAH L. REv. 1, 9-10.
211. Id. at 28.
nary probative value. Quite to the contrary, the exceptions often
overlook significant probative dangers of perception, memory, and
narration. To insist upon extraordinary probative value for the evi-
dence admissible under the residual exceptions would be inconsis-
tent; we do not require that quantum of probative value in the case of
hearsay evidence we routinely admit. To impose that requirement
under the residual exceptions would perpetuate the irrationality
Professor Davis and other commentators have so convincingly at-
tacked. In short, the American Cyanamid interpretation is the more
reasonable construction.
CONCLUSION
With characteristic insight, Professor Rothstein once described the
residual exceptions as "seemingly most revolutionary, yet in actuali-
ty most traditional. '212 His description is accurate. In appearance,
the residual exceptions seem to grant trial judges bold, new discre-
tion. Yet in truth, even if the exceptions receive a liberal construc-
tion, they will merely preserve the pre-Rule common law scope of the
federal trial judge's power.
A narrow construction would represent an unfortunate, reaction-
ary step. The legislative history of the exceptions does not require
that step backward; the legislative history materials are the product
of political compromise and are almost predictably self-contradic-
tory. The exceptions' text and Article VIII's liberal tone cut against
the narrow construction. Finally, only the broad construction, giving
"equivalent" its plain meaning, will eliminate the irrational incon-
sistency of hearsay law.
There are undoubtedly those who will take up the refrain that a
liberal construction of the residual exceptions will unsettle federal
hearsay law. However, even liberally construed, the exceptions will
not unduly unsettle hearsay law so long as that law has the adminis-
trators the common law always assumes: trial judges of responsible
judgment21 and creative ability.
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